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ABSTRACT 
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MANKIND’S INVOLVEMENT WITH TECHNOLOGY 
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Supervisor: Assist.Prof.Dr. Mahmut Mutman 
Sept, 2001 
 
 
 
 
This thesis aims to discuss the prosthetic quality of technology 
whilst considering prosthesis as a ‘concept’ in debt to a series of 
problematics that exceed the common definition of the word in the 
medical context. Departing from Freudian theory and criticism, the 
prosthetic quality of technology is taken into hand in relation to 
certain anxieties and instincts that stamp the construction of 
subjecthood. Additionally, the dilemma embedded in the psychical 
‘program’ that ascribes a prosthetic quality to technology, is 
depicted with reference to a further discussion on  technology and 
prosthesis. 
 
Keywords: Prosthesis, technology, castration anxiety, death 
instincts, doppelgänger. 
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PROTEZ OLARAK TEKNOLOJİ: İNSANOĞLUNUN 
TEKNOLOJİYLE SÜREGELEN İLİŞKİSİNE DAİR ELEŞTİREL 
BİR YAKLAŞIM 
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Tez yöneticisi: Yard. Doç.Dr. Mahmut Mutman 
Eylül, 2001 
 
 
 
Bu çalışma, protezi, tıp alanındaki yaygın tanımının ötesinde bir 
‘kavram’ olarak ele almayı ve bu kavramsallaştırmayı  mümkün kılan 
bir dizi sorunsal çerçevesinde, teknolojinin protez niteliğini 
tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır. Buna göre teknolojinin protez niteliği, 
Freudyen kuram ve eleştirilerden yola çıkarak, öznelik kurgusuna 
içkin kimi endişe ve içgüdülerle ilişkili biçimde ele alınmıştır. 
Ayrıca gerek teknoloji gerekse protez üzerine başka bazı 
tartışmaların ışığında, teknolojiye kaçınılmaz olarak protez 
niteliği atfeden ‘programın’ barındırdığı sorun ve açmazlar da konu 
edilmiştir.   
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Protez, teknoloji, hadım endişesi, ölüm içgüdüsü, 
doppelgänger. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1. Aim of the Study 
 
 
     Drawing an ever-increasing interest with its 
rapid progress and social impacts, technology has 
become one of the chief concerns of the contemporary 
age, occupying a vast amount of literature in 
philosophical, sociological and media studies. Even 
though the diversity of studies at stake is 
indisputably immense to cover in brief,  a plain -if 
not banal mapping would nevertheless lead to the 
questions and interests that this thesis aims to 
touch.  
 
     Although the wide spectrum of literature 
concerning technology welcomes diversity in approach 
and theory, some renowned discussions revolve around 
matters such as the ideological operations that 
technology rests upon and issues of instrumentality 
and progression as the agents of such operations on 
broader social and historical scale. Taking up 
 2 
technology as a momentous critique of modernity, 
countless debates from Heidegger’s ‘world picture’ to 
Habermas’ claim of technology as essentially non-
social and neutral, could well be illustrated as such 
which bring forth the question of technology either in 
an implicit or overt manner. However, would it be 
possible to cast the ideological and social 
engagements of technology aside and approach to the 
question from a rather different angle? Could 
technology be problematized in an alternative fashion 
to suggest a prosthetic and supplemantary aspect in 
mankind’s bodily, mental and even psychical 
involvement with technology? 
 
     In that respect, media studies and techno- 
embodiment debates as two other topologies in concern, 
provide much plentiful sources and discussions to 
problematize the auxiliary quality of technology. With 
spatio-temporal relations added in focus, a number of 
media studies, the most prominent of which is 
McLuhan’s Understanding Media: Extensions of Man 
(1964), take information technologies as auxiliary 
organs that extend the limits of human mind and 
perception. Debates concerning the issue of 
technological embodiment on the other hand, focus on 
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the present and future possibilities of gender and 
identity with respect to the human body that is 
powered by recent technologies of artificial 
transplantation and high- tech products. While the 
specifics of their focus may range from medico-
technologies to virtual reality, bio- industries to 
exhausting cyborg narrations, these debates share one 
essential claim all the same: there is something 
prosthetic and supplementary about the technologies of 
embodiment.  
 
     Although these and such points remain to be 
stimulating, discussions about the supplementary and 
prosthetic function of certain technologies might well 
be raised onto another level by a number of critical 
questions. Instead of focusing on certain information 
technologies or those of embodiment, could it be 
argued from a critical perspective that all  
technological objects and innovations are prostheses 
by and large? If positive, would it be possible to 
conceptualize technology as prosthesis regardless of 
whether as  a supplement to the very flesh and bone or 
to the perception and mind of the human subject? Could 
it be legitimate to regard technology as prosthesis 
not only of practical function and progressive value 
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but also in relation to the subject seeking an ideal 
image of himself? 
 
     The inquest of this work at hand is to 
problematize ‘technology’ as ‘prosthesis’ in such a 
way that would enable to discuss mankind’s 
relationship to technological innovations and objects 
with reference to a deeply rooted psychical wish: the 
wish or illusion of becoming a ‘prosthetic God’ that 
wears various technologies as his auxiliary organs not 
only for practical reasons but to contend with 
anxieties embedded in the psychical nature of 
subjecthood. 
 
     Beyond the medical context in which the word puts 
on its literal meaning, theoretical implementation of 
‘prosthesis’ in this study, is restricted neither to 
the  artificial replacements for missing body organs 
nor to their actual attachment to the very flesh and 
bone of human body. Prosthesis rather stands as a 
concept and a figure that powerfully demonstrates the 
problematics of multiplicity, fragmentation and 
seperation that are immanent to any structure, 
identity and construction based upon superior claims 
of unity, originality  and order. Therefore, as it 
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will be discussed at length on further chapters, the 
concept of prosthesis inexorably reveals itself as a 
versatile means in many fields of criticism ranging 
from a post structuralist questioning of Cartesian 
dualities to a deconstructivist approach towards the  
question of writing and representation. Yet in this 
thesis, the concept is employed to pose a number of 
questions concerning technology and to discuss its 
prosthetic value to soothe the problematics of unity, 
order and accommodation that confronts the human 
subject through his psychical course.  
 
     Correspondingly, the perspective from which 
technology is handled in this thesis is restricted 
neither to recent technologies of embodiment nor to 
their practical function and/or  use- value in terms 
of extending bodily and perceptual capacities. Instead 
from a wholistic approach, technology is considered to 
be a prosthesis by and large which serves the aims of 
recollecting the lost omnipotence and soothing the 
anxieties of self- unity that man has to bear whilst 
becoming a subject in psychoanalytical terms. In that 
respect, questions concerning castration anxiety along 
with  fears of seperation and fragmentation, and  the 
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problematic of death are inquired in order to discuss 
mankind’s  prosthetic relation to technology.  
 
 
1.2. Theoretical Framework and Limitations of the 
Study 
 
     In order to establish a contrivance regarding 
technology as prosthesis, the first and foremost 
obligation has been to problematize the concept of 
prosthesis in a critical manner. Thanks to David 
Wills, his intense book titled Prosthesis (1995) along 
with his article Mourning (1998) have provided not 
only the first steps for such an intricate beginning 
but also relieved to frame the pyschical moments 
embedded in subject’s engagements with technology as 
prosthesis. Starting with his father’s wooden leg and 
proceeding with verses from Virgil, a painting by 
Charles Conder, Freud’s reservations in dealing with 
occultism, the problematic of translation, a film by 
Peter Greenaway and 16th century medicine, the book 
Prosthesis is in fact claiming a lot more about the 
concept of prosthesis than what just a mere 
psychoanalytical account would claim.  Taking 
prosthesis as a figure illustrating the problematic of 
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supplementarity and unity, Wills provides a discussion 
on the  impossibility of wholeness of whatever body 
and structure at stake- whether textual, rhetorical, 
visual and corporeal.  However in doing so, Wills 
wittingly avoids a modest, descriptive attitude 
towards prosthesis as well as a lucid discussion 
around the concept. On the contrary, he constantly 
reminds the reader of  his writing as an enactment of 
prosthesis itself (Wills, 1995: 9-11; 16; 18). 
Therefore, certain ‘fragments’ from this difficult 
book have been selected in order to keep Wills’ 
discussions within a rather psychoanalytical frame. 
Deriving from these fragments, Wills’ discussion of 
prosthetic operations- namely the operations of 
[dis/re] placement, transfer and  accomodation are 
scrutinized with reference to subject’s pychical 
engagement with technology. By the same token and 
perhaps through an easier narration this time, Wills’ 
article Mourning (1998) opens up another door to seek 
psychoanalytic legitimacy to conceptualize prosthesis 
when it comes to human subject. Starting with the 
wooden leg of Wills’ father once more, the article 
touches the problematic of  parental framework whose 
structure of loss constitutes the human subject at the 
price of various [dis]articulations and [dis/con] 
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junctions of the Oedipal. These two works of Wills 
therefore, pay an essential contribution to the ways 
in which prosthesis could be problematized and 
discussed in the case of technology as a prosthetic 
means to recover subject’s psychical insecurities 
concerning unity, loss and accomodation. 
         
     Following the critical conceptualization of 
prosthesis, the next echelon for the theoretical 
framework would be the contention of the 
psychoanalytical plot in which  why’s and how’s behind 
subject’s engagement with technology as prosthesis 
could be brought up. In that respect, other 
‘fragments’ from the book Prosthesis (1995) are 
selected since their focus on certain texts of and 
about Freudian analysis has been more than helpful to 
set such a plot. Evenmore, some of those texts 
employed in Wills’ appraisal of Freudian literature 
have been taken as individual references in this 
thesis, to grasp those psychical moments directing 
human subject into a prosthetic relation with 
technology.  
 
     E.T.A. Hoffmann’s story The Sandman (1817; 1982) 
and Freud’s The Uncanny (1919; 1986) are the two of 
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these texts. Kofman’s compelling account on The 
Sandman  is another (1991), in which she criticizes 
Freud’s analysis of the story in  The Uncanny. While 
our contemporary age offers numerous technological 
innovations and cyberpunk imagination, The Sandman as 
a typical example of the 19th century Romantic 
literature may not appear to be the perfect pick at 
first glance, for a discussion on technology as 
prosthesis. Meanwhile, Freud’s interest in the story 
is limited to exploring the ways in which castration 
anxiety- symbolized as the fear of loosing one’s eyes 
in the story, could be argued as a universal case of 
the uncanny. Yet, Kofman’s alternative analysis of The 
Sandman, pluralist in the sense of bringing the other 
themes of the story into an equal consideration, has 
turned this Romantic piece into a major reading for 
this thesis. With Kofman’s suggestion of a linkage 
between the themes of castration, fear of 
seperation/fragmentation, death and doppelgänger in 
the story, an analysis of The Sandman has enabled to 
adress those pyschical  moments that direct subject’s 
relation to technology as prosthesis. Accordingly, 
mankind’s involvement with technology as prosthesis is 
problematized as a projection of the subject’s vain 
quest to possess an ideal image of himself as 
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omnipotent and intact- an ideal related to the 
disturbance of castration anxiety and fear of 
seperation/fragmentation. 
 
     As further exploration of the concept prosthesis 
has indicated, an attempt to problematize technology 
as prosthesis would be incomplete if one misses the 
essential dilemma embedded in the psychical course of 
human subject: the dilemma of mortality.  But where 
exactly do technology as prosthesis and the 
problematic of death meet? If the pyschoanalytical 
reasoning mentioned above is continued, would it be 
possible to argue technology as that prosthesis which 
promises a return to a state of imaginary unity and 
omnipotence lost after the encounter with  castration 
threat? For the same psychoanalytical reasoning 
suggests a strong relation between castration anxiety 
and fear of seperation/ fragmentation, would it be 
possible to approach technology as that prosthesis in 
the service of death insticts that deny the reality of 
seperation and difference revealed by castration 
threat? To handle these questions, Freud’s theory of 
instincts have been scrutinized with reference to his 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920; 1961) and 
Civilization and Its Discontents (1930; 1986). 
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Although harshly neglected for a number of reasons and 
kept out of focus after Freud, a systematic re-
evaluation of death insticts in Brown’s Life against 
Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History (1985) 
have eased to position death insticts within the 
teoretical framework of the study.  
 
     Last but not least, a few more remindings, 
additional to those made in the beginning of this 
chapter, need to be made regarding the way technology 
is issued in this thesis. True to the extent that, 
taking technology as a monolithic entity has become a 
less plausible approach since the increasing variety 
in the field of technology requires an awareness of 
the diversity and particularity of technologies with 
regard to their specific contexts and implementations. 
However, the use of the word ‘technology’ throughout 
this thesis points neither to an understanding of 
technology as a monolithic entity nor to a blindness 
to the importance of the authentic contexts and 
implementations of particular technologies. Far from 
an aim of presenting a criticism of technology, this 
thesis rather aims to hold a discussion about the 
possibility of ascribing a prosthetic quality to 
technology with reference to a set of psychoanalytical 
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motifs behind subject’s engagement with it. In that 
respect, although a specific focus on recent 
technologies may seem to be much more appropriate to 
set examples for mankind’s prosthetic relations with 
technology, no specific examples as such have been 
examined in this thesis. On the contrary, Don Ihde’s 
Technology and The LifeWorld: From Garden to Earth 
(1990), is referred to for a depiction of technology 
broad enough for raising a dicussion regarding its 
prosthetic quality. 
 
     Concisely, the theoretical navigation of this 
thesis employs could be summarized as selected series 
of psychoanalytical concepts and discussions of and 
about castration anxiety, fear of 
seperation/fragmentation, double/doppelgänger and 
death instincts along with the basic arguments 
regarding the concept of prosthesis and technology.  
 
 
1.3. Chapters in Brief 
 
     Following Introduction, the critical 
conceptualization of prosthesis and preliminary 
remarks concerning the prosthetic possibility of 
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technology are issued in Chapter 2. This chapter 
begins with the history of prosthesis in mythology and 
medicine gathered from a number sources dealing with 
the very first historical cases of prosthesis, its 
employment by various mythological figures and medical 
advancements in the realm of prosthetics through time. 
The reason for taking such a start is not only to 
present prosthesis with a hopefully interesting 
beginning, but rather to show that prosthesis has 
always already been complementary to the 
[re]construction of subjectivity as much as that of 
bodily unity. With reference to Wills’ 
conceptualization of prosthesis, the discussion is 
proceeded on human subjectivity and its employment of 
prosthetic framings to abandon the innate anxities of 
unity, completeness and order.  Chapter 2 ends with an 
argument of technology in regards to Ihde to 
illustrate that prosthetic relations  are inescapably 
inherited in every engagement with technology.  
 
     Deriving from his powerful metaphor of Garden of 
Eden, Ihde argues that from the moment Adam and Eve 
were condemned from the Garden and exiled to Earth, 
the word ‘human’ has become graspable in its proper 
meaning: the deficient mortal with the everlasting 
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problem of adaptation (Ihde, 1990: 12- 13)- or rather 
with the problem of transfer into the otherness if one 
wishes to recall Wills here (1995: 12-13). Within the 
enclosure of this metaphor, Ihde argues that human 
life has been conditioned by technology since the very 
beginning. From a different perspective though, the 
metaphor at stake serves a linkage to Chapter 3  in 
which the relation between Thanatos and technology-as-
prosthesis is discussed.  
 
     Drawing a distinction between a ‘suicidal 
tendency’ and the operation of Thanatos, this chapter 
questions to what extent technology serves the 
retrospective foreclosure of death insticts: that is 
the denial of seperation. Beginning with an outline of 
Freud’s both early and late theory of instincts, the 
chapter continues with Brown’s criticism of Freud’s 
dualist structure of insticts as Eros vs Thanatos. 
Brown’s argument is that the two instincts lean on 
each other in a dialectic fashion rather than 
struggling in a dualism (1985: 82-86). Since this 
dialectic account of Brown also brings the long 
neglected theory of death insticts up to fronts, his 
alternative reading carries further significance to 
cast aside possible criticism regarding the 
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problematization of Thanatos [and not Eros] in the 
realm of this thesis. After an assessment of these 
points, technology is discussed as that prosthesis 
serving the retrospective project of Thanatos: a 
return to and/or the recovery of a state that was 
disturbed by  the subject’s encounter with the 
unavoidable seperation and fragmentation. 
 
     Although each chapter of this study is designed 
to enfold one layer of the theoretical discussion at 
stake, Chapter 4 precisely amasses the concepts and 
debates put forth in previous chapters. Taking 
Hoffmann’s story The Sandman as a generous text to 
trace subject’s psychical engagement with the concept 
of prosthesis, the chapter begins with the abstract of 
the story. Subsequently, the themes of castration 
anxiety and doppelgänger in the story are taken into 
consideration with reference to Freud’s The Uncanny 
(1919; 1986) and two critical accounts of this text by 
Kofman (1991) and Weber (2000).   
 
     The significance of Kofman’s account for the 
inquest of thesis is that it presents a possible 
association between castration anxiety and employment 
of doppelgänger through the death instincts (1991: 
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158-160). Since the castration anxiety induces the 
fear of seperation and fragmentation, it is equally a 
threat to subject’s ideal image of himself as 
omnipotent. In addition, as the instances in the story 
Sandman reveal, employment of doppelänger serves to a 
narcisstic attempt of the subject to recover what he 
has lost in his encounter with the threat of 
castration (1990: 143-145).  In that respect, Kofman’s 
pluralist reading of the themes in The Sandman is 
treated to consider  doppelgänger as prosthetic in 
general  and technology as a prosthetic doubling in 
specific.  
 
     On the other hand, Weber’s account of the story 
carries significance to put forth the impasse of the 
program of technology-as-prosthesis. True to the 
extent that the uncanny involvement of Nathanael [the 
main protagonist of the story] with some spyglasses  
can be regarded as prosthetic since what he 
obsessively tries [and fails] to see through the 
glasses is the ubiquity of the male sexual organ. On 
the other hand, “what the prosthesis brings closer is 
the inescapability of seperation: the seperation of 
eyes from sockets, of the perspective from that which 
it reveals and that which sees through it” (Weber, 
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2000: 18- original emphasis). In other words any 
prosthesis, including technology, is doomed to fail in 
its attempt to unify and restore since its double 
nature already implies fragmentation. Therefore, the 
relation between castration anxiety, doppelgänger and 
death instincts is problematized  in Chapter 4 to 
display the program of technology -as-prosthesis in 
two folds: the psychical motivation behind the program 
and how this program unavoidably fails.  
 
     Conclusive remarks and possible questions for a 
further study are put forward in the final chapter  of 
this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2. PROSTHESIS AND TECHNOLOGY: FORMULATION AND 
SCOPE  
 
 
 
     Prosthesis: An artifical replacement for a 
missing body part, or a device designed to 
improve a specific body function. Prostheses 
include artificial limbs, false teeth, hearing 
aids, artifical kidneys, and implanted 
pacemakers. Recent improvements have included 
lighter materials, more realistic appearance, 
and greater flexibility, which allow a more 
normal continuation of daily activities, 
including participation in such sports such as 
skiing, basketball and running.  
       (Columbia Electronic Encylopedia, 1994) 
 
 
     Man has, as it were, become a kind of a 
prosthetic God. When he puts all his auxiliary 
organs he is truly magnificent; but those 
organs have not grown on to him and they still 
give him much trouble at times.         
 
      (Freud, SE XXI, 1986: 91- 92) 
 
 
 Prosthetics- The castration complex 
raised to the level of an art form.         
          (Ballard, 1992: 271) 
 
 
     But all that functions only because of 
prosthesis, because the parts were always 
already detachable, replaceable, because the 
transfer effect upon which the general is 
constructed is there at the very beginning, in 
the nonintegrality of that beginning, called 
prosthesis.  
                 (Wills, 1995: 15) 
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2.1. The History of Prosthesis in Mythology and Medicine 
 
     A classical approach to prosthesis would begin with 
the classical assumption that it is a device, an 
artificial construction designed and utilized to 
supplement an organ and/or function being lacked. Such an 
assumption would call into mind an equally classical 
example of prosthesis within the realm of the medical. 
Even though today’s medicine, in an interdisciplinary 
collaboration with various fields of science, engineering 
and technology presents numerous advancements in 
prosthetics such as implantations of aluminum plates to 
support skeletal system, epiretinal prosthesis with 
mechanical properties, or penile implantations, it is 
still the artificial limb that is recalled when the word 
‘prosthesis’ is at hand. Perhaps such a recalling is not 
missing the mark as much as one would think it does.  
 
     Ever since the very dawning of science and medical 
thought, limb prosthesis has been the earliest field of 
prosthetics to exist and to be developed in the history 
of mankind. The early civilizations of Greece, Egypt and 
Rome provide a rich history of first true rehabilitation 
aids recognized as prosthesis, which serve for various 
reasons such as physical function, cosmetic appearance 
 20 
and even for the maintenance of  the wholeness of the 
human body in psycho- spiritual sense. Although the 
tradition of oral history as a common feature shared by 
many ancient civilizations makes it quite difficult to 
date the very first prosthesis in time, poems, myths and 
epic as well as the archeological findings nevertheless 
reveal the interesting fact that prosthesis has always 
been on the agenda of mankind. Among the cases of amputee 
gods in the mythologies of various civilizations, one of 
the most remarkable examples occur to be the Celtic Irish 
God New Hah, being a left arm amputee with a silver 
prosthesis (Padula and Friedmann, 1987 cited in 
Northwestern University Prosthetics Orthetics Center1, 
2001). Another example is Pelops, the grandson of Zeus 
and son of Tantalus, who comes back to life with a 
prosthetic ivory shoulder, marking the eventful story of 
his death (Romm, 1988 cited in NUPOC, 2001). An equally 
remarkable finding would be from Rig- Veda, an ancient 
sacred poem of India written in Sanskrit between 3500 and 
1800 BC. Recounting the story of a warrior, Queen 
Vishpla, who lost her leg in a battle and returned back 
to the field with an iron prosthesis fitted,  Rig- Veda 
is said to be the first written record of a prosthesis, 
discovered so far (Sanders, 1986 cited in NUPOC, 2001). 
                                                 
1 To be referred to as NUPOC hereafter. 
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     In addition to such mentioning of prosthesis in the 
examples of oral history, archeological findings reveal 
the Egyptian mystery of prosthetics, being a common 
practice of attaching artificial body parts made of wood 
or leather, to dead bodies of amputees as a preparation 
for their after- death. However, the archeological survey 
run in Thebes-West exposed not another case of 
prosthetics realized in the same fashion, but a finding 
very much significant for the history of prosthesis. 
Different than the previously found Egyptian prostheses, 
the marks of use and abrasion on the sole of the 
prosthetic toe of this Egyptian mummy from the New 
Kingdom period [around 1550- 1700 BC] have indicated that  
the prosthetic toe had been used during the life time. 
While several different Egyptian prostheses ranging from 
wooden noses to dental wear had already been brought to 
light yet soon found out to be replacements arranged 
after death, this case in specific is recorded to be the 
oldest known limb prosthesis, in addition to signs of 
dental wear which too, proves to having been used during 
the body’s lifetime (Nerlich et al., 2000).  
  
     From the early civilizations to our contemporary 
age, the history of prosthesis has been marked not only 
by medical and scientific progression but also by  the 
 22 
dynamism of various social phenomena- the most 
significant of which is war technologies. While the basic 
peg legs and hand hooks are known as the typical 
prostheses of Dark Ages, general innovations in war 
technologies of the  European continent such as the use 
of cannon shot and gun powder by the mids of the 14th 
century, have brought  much common use and improved 
design of prosthesis in those times of armor and wars 
(NUPOC, 2001). With the hallmark of advancements in 
medical scene, the masterpieces of armory of 1600s have 
changed in amazing scale by the 1800s, adding smooth 
function, easy adjustment and better appearance to 
designs of prosthesis (Thomas and Haddan, 1945; Romm, 
1998 cited in NUPOC 2001).  
 
     Back on to the stage of human history but this time 
with much massive impact, Modern Warfare starting with 
the American Civil War and continuing with World War I 
and II, designated not only an equally massive demand for 
prosthesis but also advancements penetrating prosthetics 
into a newer scientific vision and technological 
enhancements. 
 
     If technologies and relations of warfare have been 
the major phenomena stamping the field of medical 
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prosthetics of earlier ages, it is the interdisciplinary 
colloborations that mark the medical prosthetics of our 
contemporary times. Today, researchers focus on 
possibilities to develop such prostheses of which 
automatic adaptation to the amputee would be compatible 
with variations in forward speed and patient size whilst 
reducing the problem of discrimination in social life due 
to unnatural seeming posture and motion. Moreover, 
present limb prostheses controlled and guided by its user 
via microchips, motors and pressure points, have started 
to challenge the future face of prosthetics. The most 
remarkable example for that would be the  ‘bionic’ arm 
articulated to a patient for the first time in 1998 (The 
Lancet, 1999). Most recently, researchers are working  to 
develop such prosthetic limbs that would be used not by 
the guidance of vision as in the usual case of amputees, 
but by the guidance of touch, instead. As the related 
research project run by MCP Hannemann School of Medicine, 
Philadelphia has succeeded to do so, thought controlled 
prosthesis based on the transmission of  senses of touch 
to the brain [to coordinate the activity of prosthetic 
limb], is assumed to be a step closer to the future 
promises  in the field of prosthetics (The Lancet, 1999). 
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     However common such an understanding of prosthesis 
as a medical device might be, a critical look towards the 
further implications of the concept necessiates the 
questioning of this limited understanding of prosthesis 
as being ultimately medical. If one is to problematize 
the issue of prosthesis by expanding it as a concept 
beyond the fuse of flesh and steel, what would this 
concept imply other than a practical purpose of 
reinstating a missing body organ and/or function? In what 
ways could prosthesis be considered outside the scene of 
medicine and what kind of possibilities would such a 
conceptualization offer for criticism? 
 
     In search for answers to such questions, let us 
return to those mythological stories of prosthesis 
mentioned earlier and take the case of Pelops. According 
to the story, Tantalus- the son of Zeus, cuts his own son 
Pelops into pieces, stews his flesh and serves his 
dismembered body as a feast for the gods. When the gods 
discover this trick, they restore the dismembered body of 
Pelops, bring him back to life and provide an ivory 
prosthesis for his shoulder that has already been eaten 
by Demeter. In the end, Tantulus is punished by being 
‘tantalized’ with hunger and thirst- for his crime 
involves the transgression of proper boundaries regarding 
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food. (Encyclopedia Mythica, 1995). Yet, the matter at 
stake in this piece of mythology could also be viewed as 
the problematization of boundaries in regards to the 
themes of body and prosthesis. In addition, just when 
reconsidered within that perspective, the story takes a 
rather interesting turn. If Pelops’ body could be taken 
as the theme representing the human body as the prior 
zone for the problematic of boundaries and order, his 
ivory prosthesis then, occurs to imply more than just a 
practical device to restore his missing shoulder. On a 
broader and critical spectrum, the prosthesis at stake 
serves to maintain boundaries and order as well. In that 
case, where does prosthesis as a concept belong? To the 
realm of medicine and the surface of human body? Or to 
the realm of subjectivity where the human body 
systematically communicates those problematics of unity, 
boundaries and order? 
 
     If we move onto the major reference of this thesis, 
the discussions of David Wills, two possible postulations 
come at hand regarding ‘prosthesis’: Firstly, because the 
concept prosthesis reveals that the maintenance of every 
possible unity and boundary relies on the establishment 
of prosthetic relations, superior claims of self- 
contained completeness and order come out as equally 
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fictive. Secondly and respectively that, prosthesis can 
well be employed as a concept to question those 
problematics in various fields ranging from medicine to 
subjectivity, literature to theory.  
 
 
2.2. From a Wooden Leg to Virgil’s Verses: The Concept of 
Prosthesis in Wills 
 
     David Wills’ book Prosthesis (1995) is the one and 
presumably the only study that inquires possibilities of 
theory and criticism through a critical conceptualization 
of prosthesis. In this fairly intense book, Wills 
provides accounts slipping back and forth, in and outside 
theory and narration, autobiography and fiction all of 
which build up his critical writing on prosthesis. With 
frequent mentioning of  Wills’ bitter-sweet memories of 
childhood with respect to bearing an amputated father, 
the book departs from an actual wooden prosthesis and 
arrives at the prevalence of prosthetic relations in 
every possible field from parental affairs to the problem 
of translation, from religion to writing. Although such a 
perspective consequently relieves prosthesis from its 
narrow dictionary definition, it is nevertheless 
impossible to conceive the concept without the material 
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body itself- with all its utterances to the problematic 
of subjecthood. Therefore, the wooden leg of Wills’ 
father seems to be more than just a too much too repeated 
metaphor but rather serves as a gentle reminder of this 
obligation. 
 
     When Wills’ father, an amputee with a wooden leg 
since the age of 18, suffers from ‘phantom’ pains or when 
the pain is felt on the way to hit, father meets the 
phantom pain with the following line from Virgil in 
Latin: 
 
“Quadrupendante putrem sonitu quatit ungula campum.” 
 
which means: 
 
“The hoof strikes the dusty plain in a four-footed 
rhythm” (Virgil, 1965 cited in Wills, 1995: 3). 
 
     Although being probably a routine part of his 
everyday life, this doomed ceremony of Wills’ father 
promises a number of passages of which structure of loss  
calls the issue of prosthesis into question. First of 
these is Wills’ purposive naming of the pain as ‘phantom’ 
and its implications about his father’s body. Among other 
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‘things’ like vampires, zombies and golems which are out 
of the proper order yet  set between the alive and dead, 
existent and non-existent, phantom is an undecidable 
thing, a floating signifier of the ‘in-between’. While 
the uncertainty at stake in terms of the order and 
placement between the phantom pain and the line from 
Virgil is an undecidability [which precedes which: the 
line from Virgil preceding the pain or following it?], 
the relation between the phantom pain and the amputated 
body of Wills’ father is another problem in the same 
fashion. For Wills, the phantom pain designates more than 
just an amputated body crying out loud its primacy over 
the everyday existence that is paralyzed by some pain 
shock. The pain at stake is rather a crying manifesto of 
the return of some repressed fears and anxieties of 
corruption and disassemblage that can well be generalized 
to the problematic of the human body (1995: 12- 15)- and 
possibly to the problematic of subjecthood as well. Such 
a manifesto which equally brings forth that the human 
body has already been a prosthetic ensemble, fragmented 
and recollected upon a unique ‘economy of loss’-long 
before an actual amputation necessitates an actual 
prosthesis. 
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     As Wills’ discussion proceeds gradually, the 
significance of this economy of loss becomes more 
noticeable for a critical conceptualization of 
prosthesis. When Wills takes another flashback in his 
memories and realizes that the Child Development Center, 
Artificial Limb Center and Sexual Health Center of his 
hometown hospital were next to one another, this economy 
of loss behind the question of prosthesis adresses once 
again to the contituent of subjecthood, along with its 
implementations on the material body. Claiming the 
pediatric, the prosthetic and erotic as various 
articulations of the Oedipal, “how a child relates to a 
father defined as lack, how castration operates in terms 
of artificial replacement as much as in terms of 
amputation or deprivation (…)”, Wills draws attention to 
the developmental process as a negotiation on a series of 
[dis/con]junctions, articulations and replacements that 
are bodily and psychically experienced (1998: 16). For 
the essential examples of mother’s breast, the turd, the 
phallus and the language would demonstrate, the economy 
of loss at stake acts upon various prosthetic 
replacements that stamp the formation of subjecthood. 
Would not prosthesis and/or prosthetic relations then, 
become speakable beyond some artificial device and appear 
as fundamental ‘transfer[s]’that are immanent to the 
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construction of subjecthood and the unitary conception of 
the body? 
 
     With reference to a specifically medical context or 
not, either as a medical device or as a textual ‘thing’, 
Wills argues that prosthesis is first and foremost a 
matter of rapid transfer (Wills, 1995: 12-15). Showing 
the etymological secret of the noun/verb ‘transfer’ with 
reference to the Latin in which the verb ‘ferre’ means 
‘to bear’ and its past principle form being ‘latum’ 
[ferre trans-fer trans-lation] Wills argues that, 
prosthesis occurs to be a bearing onto otherness, a realm 
of pluralities and multiplicites, that is mediated 
through  the body is at stake. In effect with the related 
operations of amputation, [dis/re]placement, substitution 
and supplementation, this transfer is by the same token a 
challenge to ‘whatever- body’ there is at stake. That is 
to say, the unitary claims  of all bodies of thought, of 
categories, textual relations as well as frameworks could 
well be put into question by the concept of prosthesis. 
At the rear of every ‘body’ that reflexively relies on an 
a priori manifesto of being full and original, originally 
full, prosthesis reveals a field or a space of 
pluralities and multiplicities untamed. Perhaps evenmore 
that bodies and structures have always been matters of 
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that space; being fictive ensembles and therefore already 
prosthetic. Or rather “there never was any such event in 
its pure singularity and prosthesis is the idea of that” 
(Wills, 1995: 15). 
 
     Consequently, the critical conceptualization is that 
prosthesis, as much as a medical, artificial, inorganic 
device, is a concept, a figure, a matter of transfer, a 
signifier of multiplicity as well as a condition, 
demonstrating the transfer relations and articulations of 
various kinds that concurrently operate behind the 
construction of whatever-body in concern.  
 
     Although it is well beyond the realm of this thesis 
to cover them all, such a critical conceptualization 
would promise valuable means to discuss the immanency of 
prosthetic relation in various fields of thought and 
practice- a few but significant instances of which could 
be set from the prosthetic shuttles  that seem to stamp 
Wills’ parental affairs. On the one hand, there is his 
father with his everlasting desire of learning foreign 
languages yet his desire remaining unfulfilled as he had 
to meet the cold face and restraints of amputation at the 
age of eighteen. On the other hand, David Wills turns out 
to be a professor of French years after, himself becoming 
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a supplement of his father with dreams fell apart. While 
it is not only good command of a foreign language but an 
education completed with success that Wills’ father once 
longed, Wills himself makes his way on the field of 
academy, with not only an education in full but also an 
education paying back respect and status. Yet, while his 
father does not have full command of any foreign 
language, his half Latin is adequate enough to supplement 
his unfulfilled desire with a line from Virgil, 
pronounced almost perfectly. Strangely enough, his 
father’s sudden switch to a different language with the 
feeling of phantom pain remains on one side, and Wills’ 
vain hope to provide a faithful translation of Virgil’s 
line to English is on the other, as Wills argues that 
trans-lation itself is a problematic of displacement, of 
prosthetic (Wills, 1995: 8-15). In short, the untamed 
shuttles between the categories of father/son, 
Latin/English, Latin/ French, family/ academy, public/ 
private point up to that haunted space where prosthetic 
operations become speakable once more.  
    
     What Wills aims to demonstrate through this lengthy 
discussion of prosthesis could perhaps be reviewed in a 
few remarks. First of all, prosthesis puts forth that the 
the supposed unity and order of every possible body 
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depends on an economy of loss that actualize various 
prosthetic operations of [dis/re]articulation, 
[dis/re]placement and supplementation. In view of that, 
it becomes plausible to consider the acts of prosthetic 
relations in various fields and/or suggest a prosthetic 
character for countless entities. If the formation of 
subjecthood along with its implementations on the body is 
one of these, the realm of language, the question of 
writing, the problems of translation and representation 
would then be others. Secondly and yet, the uncanniness 
behind  all this is that, while prosthesis serves for the 
maintanence of unity and order, it obstinately adresses 
to the impossibility of such maintenance. Prosthesis 
occurs as a rapid transfer and in that respect, it always 
brings the anxieties of corruption and disassemblage to 
the agenda.  
 
      Wills’ epistemological critique provides an 
invaluable vision to go beyond the literal sense of the 
word prosthesis and question the economy of loss and 
transfer relations that mark the construction of bodies 
whether in the realm of literature, parental affairs, 
language or subjecthood. Then, how could this economy of 
loss and transfer relations be considered  in the case of 
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technology to discuss mankind’s involvement with 
technology as merely  prosthetic?   
 
 
2.3. Initials for a Discussion on the Prosthetic Quality 
of Technology 
 
     Thanks to cyberpunk imagination and popular science, 
the innovations and future possibilities in recent 
technologies of embodiment and bio- technologies have not 
only drawn remarkable attention among masses, but also 
brought a debate that soon became a chief concern in 
technology studies. That is the debate about the fate of 
human body and identity with reference to technologies 
offering a wired future, plugged fantasies and microchip 
supported body organs. While theory and criticism about 
‘techno-bodies’ or ‘cyber-identities’ exhibit such a 
variety in tone and approach that go beyond the interest 
of this thesis, a few keywords would nevertheless give an 
idea about the common concerns that condition them all: 
artificiality, supplementarity and, to no surprise, 
prosthesis. Add the infamous arguments about the 
disappearance of material body, cyborg and hybridity into 
focus and there comes the popular technology debates in 
full picture. A monstrous threat to the human condition 
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for some, a techno- evolution to others, the future held 
by recent technologies is the fusion of flesh and steel 
in which the material body would no longer carry an 
ontological status of its ‘natural’ quality. For instance 
in Panic Sex in America, Krokers ask the question: “Why 
the concern over the body today if not to emphasize the 
fact that the (natural) body in the post modern condition 
has already disappeared, and what we experience as the 
body is only a fantastic simulacra of body rhetorics?” 
(1987: 21-22, original emphasis). On further pages 
following the question, the reader is invited to 
Baudrillard’s simulacrum, cultural politics of advanced 
capitalism and Bataille’s general economy of excess to 
explore the disappearance of body in hyper- modern 
condition. Through such different points of reference 
though, the basic opposition that lies under techno-body 
debates reveals itself still: the natural- artificial 
opposition. With the irresistible power of 
biotechnologies and computer-generated technologies of 
vision and representation, human body is pictured to be 
falling drastically into ‘de-naturalization’. Along with 
the exteriorization effect of medical technologies, 
Krokers argue that human body has no chance other 
becoming a floating sign in the end, free of its natural 
quality and, obsolete instead (1987: 29-32).  
 36 
     Although such a picture may at first glance seem to 
be just perfect for a discussion on the prosthetic 
quality of technology, a further look at the implications 
beneath such a problematization of human body and 
technology would simply suggest the opposite. For if we 
return to the previous discussion on Wills’ perspective, 
not only the unity and order claims of various bodies and 
entities, but also the abstract rhetorical categories 
that accommodate such claims could equally be questioned 
in the light of the concept prosthesis. Since the 
hierarchical categories and binary oppositions serve to 
fix and maintain boundaries for the approval of such 
claims of unity and order, is not there something 
prosthetic about these categories as well? To be more 
specific, has human body ever been in a pure state of 
nature at all? 
 
     As opposed to the implications of Krokers’ debate, 
Balsamo (1995) does not quite agree with the legitimacy 
of natural- artificial opposition for some prophecy about 
the disappearance of the human body. Drawing attention to 
the discursive operations behind such binary oppositions 
and categories, Balsamo rather underlines the ideological 
urge to fix a hierarchy and proper order among ‘things’.  
Accordingly, the ideological yet nevertheless out-moded 
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category of ‘natural’ body and the myth of its 
disappearance could become graspable only when realized 
that the presence of human body is nothing but a 
continual mapping of the social, cultural, political and 
technological discourses. In a similar fashion with 
Wills’ statement on prosthetic operations as matters of 
rapid transfer, human body for Balsamo is both a product 
and a process, an entity under construction that 
continually shuttles between nature and culture, the 
natural and the artificial and so forth (1995: 216- 220). 
In other words, the prosthetic state and/or the 
disappearance of the [natural quality of] human body 
could neither be argued as a new phenomenon epidemic to 
some hyper-modern condition nor with respect to those 
technologies of embodiment only. For the human individual 
is borne into the social, the realm of various sign 
systems and codings as well as material culture, human 
body has been a cyborg, long before putting on some 
virtual reality gadgets or having artificial organs 
transplanted. 
 
     True to the extent that the word ‘cyborg’ and 
contemporary discussions around it, carry a futuristic 
tone and explicitly refer to the possession of technology 
‘under skin’. However, the word significantly designates 
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what the critical conceptualization of prosthesis would 
mean for a discussion on technology. First of all, as 
Wills’ discussion on the economy of loss and its 
management through prosthetic operations have 
demonstrated, the question of prosthesis is not unique to 
some specific interaction between human body and material 
culture. The concept of prosthesis is equally plausible 
to consider the purposes of ideological accommodation 
behind the hierarchy and order set among discursive 
categories and binary oppositions. Secondly and 
accordingly, prosthetic relations could well be traced in 
various realms other than technology. Since some of these 
have been formerly exemplified as semiotics, the problem 
of translation and writing, announcing technology as the 
ultimate prosthesis would simply be unfaithful to what 
has been tried to put forth so far.  In that respect, it 
should be underlined that a discussion of technology 
based on some fixed attributions around the opposition 
between natural-artificial, would simply be not a step 
ahead the medical meaning of the word prosthesis. The 
assumption of technology as prosthesis rather requires a 
perspective that exceeds the discursive obligations of 
natural- artificial debate and considers the prosthetic 
quality of technology on a level broader than the surface 
of flesh and bone.  
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     Disregarding these binary oppositions that viciously 
pull the question of technology at either one end or 
another, Ihde’s criticism of technology (1990) suggests 
an alternative approach towards human- technology 
interaction. While affirming the rapture between the 
implementations of technologies of the past and present, 
Ihde nevertheless holds the view that technology has 
always been on the agenda of mankind as a material aspect 
of culture and civilization. With various anthropological 
cases from Tasaday to Inuit, his argument demonstrates 
that even those states of mankind that are assumed to be 
‘primitive’ and equally ‘natural’ have always been 
dependent on technology (1990: 13-15).  In other words, 
though represented from a unique perspective of his own, 
Ihde’s discussion points to the narrowness of a 
formulation of technology that is based on the well 
exhausted categories of binary oppositions.  Instead of 
being dazzled with the extreme examples of applied 
science in the urban environment, Ihde draws attention to 
the ancient times in which craftworks and tool making 
could still be regarded as technology, however simple and 
minimal. Taking technology as an immemorial aspect of 
culture and culture as an indispensable quality of 
mankind, he notes, “virtually every area of human praxis 
implicates a technology. From burial to birth to eating 
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and working, the use of artifacts embedded in a patterned 
praxis demarcates the human within his or her 
world”(1990: 20). True to the extent that his disinterest 
in the distinctive production and industry relations as 
well as discursive impositions behind modern technologies 
makes such a general inference problematic at times.  Due 
to the very same reason perhaps, the lack of a concrete 
definition of technology presents itself as another 
obstacle throughout the book. Yet, Ihde’s interest is to 
show that the question of nature has never been an issue 
of mankind for his existence is always already  
“technologically textured” (1990: 1; 3). Therefore, he 
describes the notion of technology in the book to be a 
phenomenological one, navigational and relativistic in 
the sense that it aims to draw a framework rather than 
formulaic answers to the question of technology (1990: 9-
10). 
 
     Although to what extent these and such ambiguities 
could be tolerated remains questionable, Ihde’s notion of 
technology nevertheless holds two significant 
possibilities for inscribing a prosthetic quality to 
technology. The first of these is Ihde’s “phenomenology 
of technics” (1990: 72) in which a rather broad 
perspective is suggested to problematize the issue of 
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technological embodiment. While the words ‘technology’ 
and ‘technics’ are used interchangeably in his book [and 
here is another problem], the word ‘technics’ in this 
case refers to a set of relations embedded in specific 
contexts of human- technology interaction. Accordingly in 
the case of what Ihde refers to as “technics embodied”, 
technology operates as a tool that extends the material 
capacity of body or its senses, in such a way that the 
tool at stake turns out to be totally transparent, as if 
its material presence is withdrawn. Picking examples 
mostly from optical technologies of glasses and 
telescopes, Ihde argues that the senses of outer reality 
as well as one’s own self perception become altered 
through the parameters of the object. Consequently, with 
the transparency of mediation involved in technics 
embodied, the relation at stake shifts from: 
    
     I see-the optical artifact- the world 
     towards  
(I-glasses)- see the world (1990:73-76).  
 
     The significance of Ihde’s technics embodied is that 
it takes the issue of embodiment on broader terms beyond 
the understanding of some actual attachment to the very 
flesh and bone- which, as presented before, is the common 
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case with most discussions concerning the technologies of 
embodiment. Thus, such a formulation enables to think on 
further cases of embodiment that represent a prosthetic 
aspect of mankind’s involvement with technology. Taking 
Ihde’s discussion a step further, Woodward (1994) argues 
that even the world history of civilization is shaped by 
such relations of embodiment that not necessarily demand 
an actual attachment to the flesh and bone of human body. 
Following the extension of the arm by the tool in 
agricultural revolution, has not the industrial 
revolution been marked by “the dexterity of human body as 
a whole with complex machines?” (1994: 50). Additionally, 
Woodward comments on the post industrial revolution in a 
McLuhanesque sense, with reference to information 
technologies as the extensions of man. For that reason 
Woodward notes that: 
 
Over hundreds of thousands of years the body, 
with the aid of various tools and technologies, 
has multiplied its strength and increased its 
capacities to extend itself in space and over 
time. According to this logic, the process 
culminates in the very immateriality of the 
body itself. In this view, technology serves 
fundamentally as a prosthesis of the human 
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body, one that ultimately displaces the 
material body, transmitting instead its image 
around the globe and preserving that image over 
time (1994: 50, emphasis added). 
 
Consequently, while the main theme behind Ihde’s 
discussion is apparently the impossibility of a natural 
state for mankind with no technology whatsoever, his 
phenomenology of technics demonstrates that the issue of 
embodiment is implicit in a diversity of interactions 
with technology, all of which carry a prosthetic quality 
whether or not being attached to the flesh and bone of 
human body. Nevertheless, both Ihde’s discussion and 
Woodward’s understanding of technology as prosthesis 
still address to a level on which the prosthetic quality 
of technology derives from issues of use- value and 
practicality. In that respect, the metaphor that Ihde has 
chosen for his technology criticism holds a second and 
much imperative possibility to contemplate further on the 
prosthetic quality of technology.   
 
     Accordingly, Ihde invites the reader to consider the 
earliest possible case of human life that is conditioned 
by technology. With his powerful metaphor of Garden of 
Eden, he argues that when Adam and Eve were condemned 
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from the Garden and exiled to Earth, the problem of 
adaptation have necessitated the use of basic technics 
and simple tools which, however minimal, were to be the 
very first examples of technology (1990: 12-13). In other 
words, from the moment the abstract purity of the garden 
was left, the price of coming into Earth appeared to be 
taking up technology.  Hence, Ihde’s response to romantic 
claims of ‘returning back to the heart of nature’ as well 
as to dystopian accounts on technology is that man’s 
survival without technology would simply be unthinkable 
both in empirical and historical sense.  
 
     Setting aside mankind’s practical need of technology 
for his survival, could this example of Adam and Eve 
possibly lead to another level for considering the 
prosthetic quality of technology? For Adam and Eve are 
the key figures of the narrative of Genesis in all holly 
books, a further look at the religious accounts of the 
story reveals interesting connections between the 
ontological status of mankind and its possible effect on 
the prosthetic aspect of technology.  
 
     As stated in holy books, Adam and Eve- before the 
commitment of the original sin, enjoy an immortal life 
among other angels in the Garden of Eden, the heavenly 
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perfection of which leaves no need or petition 
unanswered. Yet, the price Adam and Eve pay for eating 
the forbidden fruit is the extinction of their angelic 
quality which is revealed first by the appearance of 
sexual organs in their body and then, their being exiled 
to Earth as mortal beings2. In other words, the exile 
from the Garden to Earth is equally a radical transfer 
from a pure and omnipotent state of being to becoming 
human, a state confronted with lack and delimited with 
the problem of mortality. Then, could it be argued that 
the subject’s struggle with the state of human-ness, 
which is all about lack, fragmentation and mortality is 
manifested in his becoming a Prosthetic God that puts all 
his auxiliary organs, i.e. objects of technology? Hence, 
where would this transfer effect that stamps the exile 
from the Garden, coincide with the transfer effect that 
stamps the constitution of subjecthood? What would 
becoming a “Prosthetic God” as Freud argues (SE XXI, 
1986: 91-92)- or rather technology as prosthesis imply 
for the subject? A return to the Garden? 
 
 
                                                 
2 “Sin came into the world through one man and his sin brought death 
with it. As a result, death has spread to the whole human race 
because everyone has sinned.” New Testament, Paul’s Letter to Romans 
5:12. 
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CHAPTER 3. TECHNOLOGY AND THANATOS: THE UNUSUAL COUPLING 
IN QUESTION 
 
At the biological level, the death instinct, 
in affirming the road to death, affirms at the 
same time the road of life: ripeness is all. 
At the human level, the repressed death 
instinct cannot affirm life by affirming death 
(…) death can only affirm itself by 
transforming itself into the force which 
always denies life, the spirit of Goethe’s 
Mephistopheles (Brown, 1985: 103). 
 
While the issue of death is often brought up as a 
condition of the question of prosthesis in Wills’ 
discussion (1995: 128; 143, 1998: 10; 14, Gunn: 1996), 
what it implies for the construction of subjecthood in 
psychoanalytic terms is even more  significant to 
question the prosthetic quality of technology. In that 
respect, Freudian discussion on Thanatos and an 
alternative reading of Freudian theory of instincts by 
Norman O. Brown (1985) are explored in this chapter, in 
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order to suggest a relation between the operation of 
Thanatos on the subject’s level and technology as 
prosthesis. Through a dialectic and not dualistic 
interpretation of Eros and Thanatos, the retrospective 
program of death instincts is pictured to discuss the 
ways in which the prosthetic quality of technology serves 
for subject’s denial of separation and loss on the 
psychical level. 
 
 
3.1. Freudian Problematization of Instincts: Theory and 
Criticism 
 
     As evident in Psychopathology of Everyday Life 
(1909) and Civilization and Its Discontents (1930; 1986), 
Freud’s psychoanalysis has not been limited to theorizing 
the individual space of subject’s mental life but has 
also sought for the reflections of various psychoanalytic 
phenomena in the realm of culture and society. In return, 
the social and scientific thought of his contemporary 
times have been equally reflected in Freud’s writings and 
theory. From 18th century medicine to Comte and Fraser, 
influences and inspirations of biological and social 
evolutionism could well be traced in Freud’s theory in 
which psychological development is pictured most of the 
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time as analogous to the biology of simple organism and 
earlier forms of social life. Among the works with such 
influence, Civilization and Its Discontents and Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle (1920; 1961) appear as the two in 
which Freud’s theory of instincts is developed in a 
similar fashion- yet welcomes a number of objections and 
diversities for the very same reason. With an evaluation 
of Freudian theory of instincts as well as its criticism, 
it becomes possible to demonstrate the psychoanalytical 
motives behind the subject’s engagement with technology 
as prosthesis. 
 
     As “the representatives of all the forces 
originating in the interior of the body and transmitted 
to the mental apparatus” (Freud, 1961: 40), Freud defines 
the instinct “ as an urge inherent in organic life to 
restore an earlier state of things” (43). Accordingly, 
this borderland concept between the mental and 
biological, relies on three formal characteristics in 
Freudian theory. Firstly, instincts must be common to all 
the animal kingdom, yet secondly an ultimate dualism 
embedded in the nature itself must be reflected in the 
generality of instincts. Along with the third 
characteristics of instincts, i.e. a conservatism that 
aims the restoration of an earlier state, the theory of 
 49 
instincts finds its true meaning in Freudian 
psychoanalysis. With an ambivalence in debt to the 
problem of repression on the human level, instincts are 
grounded on a mutual antagonism- a duality whose 
unbounded energy is amongst the basic sources of mental 
conflict and neurosis ( Freud, 1961: 41; Brown, 1985: 
83). Although the introduction of narcissism have 
required a radical change in the formulation of the 
Freudian theory of instincts,  dualism of the theory have 
still remained, providing one of the initial explanations 
for the question of repression in Freudian 
psychoanalysis.  
 
     With reference to the infamous ‘love vs. hunger’ 
theme of Romantic literature, the dichotomy of earlier 
theory of instincts have employed sexual instincts in 
opposition to those of self- preservation. As Freud 
explains in details in Civilization and Its Discontents 
as well as Beyond the Pleasure Principle, further study 
on the libido has upset this first theory, since the 
recognition of the narcissistic character of sexual 
instincts has inexorably attached the narcissistic libido 
to self- preservation instincts (SE XXI, 1986: 117-118; 
1961: 61-62). In other words, with the introduction of 
narcissism to deeper focus, instincts of self 
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preservation have become inseparable with the operations 
of libidio- and therefore with sexual instincts, as 
well3.  Yet unlike the Jungian approach in which an 
instinctual monism is established upon the libido, 
Freudian theory of instincts has come up with a new 
dualism around 1920s:  
 
Let us suppose, then, that all organic 
instincts are conservative, are acquired 
historically and tend towards the restoration 
of an earlier state of things. (…) Every 
modification which is thus imposed upon the 
course of organism’s life is accepted by the 
conservative instincts and stored up for 
further repetition. Those instincts are 
therefore bound to give a deceptive appearance 
of being forces tending towards change and 
progress, whilst in fact they are merely 
seeking to reach an ancient goal by paths 
alike old and new (Freud, 1961: 45). 
                                                 
3 As Freud explains in On Narcissism: An Introduction: “Just as 
object- libido at first concealed ego- libido from our observation, 
so too in connection with the object- choice of infants (and of 
growing children) what we first noticed was that they derived their 
sexual objects from their experiences of satisfaction. The first 
auto-erotic sexual satisfactions are experienced in connection with 
vital functions which serve the purpose of self- preservation” 
(1914; SE XIV,1986: 87). 
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     While Freud’s infamous quote “the aim of all life 
is death” (46), neatly expresses the instinctual 
conservatism issued in the passage above, the very same 
passage could nevertheless be taken as a foreseeing of 
the association between Eros and civilization that Freud 
would be suggesting later in Civilization and Its 
Discontents. Nevertheless, an introduction concerning 
the new course of instincts does await in further pages 
of Beyond the Pleasure Principle as well. Life instincts 
[Eros]  that are conservative in the sense of preserving 
life and death instincts [Thanatos] that are 
conservative in the sense of aiming at some past point 
of suspension (1961: 49). As another foreseeing of his 
later discussion on civilization and progress, Freud 
adds that it is only those life instincts that an urge 
for higher development would emerge from in order to 
reach the final goal of life smoothly- that is death 
(1961: 50- 51). Whereas with a formulation independent 
from the operations of libido, death instincts are 
issued to be retrograde in character for a return to an 
inanimate state. In this way, the dualist nature of 
theory of instincts is preserved once again. 
 
      However, it is Civilization and Its Discontents in 
which this final theory of instincts is thoroughly 
 52 
looked at with reference to questions concerning 
civilization and progress. Dealing with the antagonism 
between the instincts and the program of civilization, 
the book equally pays attention to the mirror image of 
conscience in communal regulations and social thought, 
such as the entity of religion and/or ethics acting as 
some cultural super- ego on individuals and society. 
Although at the price of man’s discontented-ness, it is 
the very same cultural super- ego and its social 
impositions that bring the question of civilization a 
step closer to Freud’s theory of instincts. Exploring 
the history as well as the achievements of civilization 
with reference to the unconscious desires that are 
subject to super- ego and repression, Freud argues the 
energy and thus the labor of civilization and progress 
to be the sublimation of [repressed] Eros (SE XXI,1986: 
108-110; Brown, 1985: 17). In addition, with this two 
fold activity of super- ego and sublimation of the 
repressed that the power of Eros to unite and form 
becomes speakable in the case of civilization. 
Accordingly, just as Eros seeks for a union with the 
objects of love on the individual’s level, it equally 
brings about institutions of civilization and forms of 
unity among the members of society. Yet, the instincts 
of destruction, Thanatos is one big major obstacle to 
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the program of civilization, i.e. to the unity of 
mankind (SE XXI, 1986: 122). In that respect, all the 
material achievements of culture and progress, along 
with the institutions of civilization, are attributed to 
the force of Eros at work. While Freudian theory of 
instincts relies on the conservative nature of instincts 
as presented earlier, Eros appears to be a step away 
from such conservatism within this picture. Whereas 
Thanatos occurs to be associated implicitly with the 
conservatism at stake, becoming much closer to the idea 
of ‘restoring the earlier form of life’. 
 
     As Boothby (1991) states, Freud’s formulation of 
death instincts serves a lot more than the maintenance 
of his dualistic thinking only. Shedding light to the 
origins of human aggressiveness and the enigma of super- 
ego, the question of death instincts have also brought 
new theoretical opportunities for investigating the 
operation of desire on the ‘other’ (Boothby, 1991: 4-7). 
True to the extent that from Freud’s consideration of 
sado-masochism in Beyond the Pleasure Principle to 
Lacanian semiotics, a diversity of inquiries and 
implementations could be exemplified respectively. 
Still, the issue of death instincts have led to an equal 
amount of neglect and antipathy as well. A 
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misapplication of physical principles to living 
organisms for some, one the most common criticism to 
Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle has been the 
biological oxymoron embedded in his formulation of death 
instincts (Boothby, 1991: 75). For, if instincts employ 
a conservative nature and yet occur to be the most 
primordial forces of life at work for a living being, 
how could  the process of growth be explained in 
organisms? Since the question of repression and struggle 
between instincts is obviously not plausible for such 
life forms, how could death as the goal of ‘all’ life be 
bought? Then, why does an immediate self- destruction 
remain unobserved  in the biological cases on which 
Freud rests his death instinct argument? 
 
     Other criticism that the issue of death instincts 
meets is more theoretical with respect to gaps between 
Freud’s recent theory of instincts and his older 
topography concerning the psychical agencies of ego and 
id. In a similar fashion, vagueness of the discussion 
concerning the quantitative management of tension and 
excitation within the Nirvana principle has been an 
equally argumentative point in Freud’s theory of death 
instincts (Boothby, 1991: 76-78; Laplanche and Pontalis, 
1988: 100). Since this final set of objections exceed 
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the limitations of this thesis, probably the most 
relevant piece of criticism for a critical evaluation of 
death instincts would come from Otto Rank: 
 
even when he stumbled upon the inescapable 
death problem, [Freud] sought to give a new 
meaning to that also in harmony with the wish, 
since he spoke of death instinct instead of 
death fear. (…) If one had held to the 
phenomena, it would have been impossible to 
understand how a discussion of the death 
impulse could neglect the universal and 
fundamental death fear to such extent (Otto 
Rank, 1934 cited in Boothby, 1991:8).  
 
When the strength of these and such criticism is 
multiplied with the apparent optimism embedded in Freud’s 
association of progress and evolution with Eros, a 
theoretical demand to reconsider the Freudian theory of 
instincts as well as its dualistic structure becomes 
unavoidable. In that respect, Brown’s reconsideration of 
the instinct theory provides the means to challenge the 
‘hygienic’ boundaries between Eros and Thanatos, in 
addition to questioning the weight of death instincts in 
the realm of the social and cultural. 
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3.2. Eros vs. Thanatos? Towards a Dialectical Reading 
 
     Although Brown’s Life Against Death (1985) does not 
totally share such criticism that announce Freudian 
Thanatos as some excessive theoretization, the book 
nevertheless stands in with Otto Rank’s objection on the 
neglection of the element of ‘fear’ in Freud’s 
formulation of death instincts. Therefore, with the claim 
of revitalizing Freudian theory of instincts that has 
long been overlooked, Brown attempts to reinterpret the 
human history accordingly, as an integral part of 
psychoanalysis. With references to history and social 
anthropology, the book focuses on the general neurosis of 
mankind and suggests the morbidity of human sociability 
and culture as originating from the incapacity to accept 
death. Rather than Freud’s optimist illustration of Eros, 
Brown’s account employs a focus on the operations of 
Thanatos on social level- and such a focus inexorably 
demands a reconsideration of the theory of instincts. 
 
     While Beyond the Pleasure Principle has depicted the 
question of pleasure with respect to three headings that 
could be regarded as ‘subsets’ of death instincts, the 
enigma of what exactly death instincts refers to remains 
still in Freudian theory. Such an enigma that becomes 
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only less obscure when Thanatos is to be defined simply 
as the negation of Eros. However from Brown’s 
perspective, the question of death regains its 
ontological weight in addition to its implementations in 
the realm of psychoanalysis. Advancing Freud’s definition 
of death instincts as those that intend a return to the 
inanimate state, Brown relates the operation of Thanatos 
to an urge to deny the painful experience of separation 
which intrudes on the primal experience with one-ness 
with the world. With Brown’s problematization, the 
question of Thanatos does not point to a desire for death 
but instead, to an illusion of everlasting life that is 
grounded on the incapacity to accept death and separation 
(1985: 95; 100-103; 115). In other words, what is at 
stake with Thanatos is not an issue of death as itself 
merely, but rather life which inevitably and 
dialectically implies the problem of death. On the other 
hand, Freudian Eros- Thanatos dualism as well as his 
optimistic analysis of civilization with reference to 
Eros and Eros only, remains  incompatible with such a 
dialectical ambivalence. Even when Freud seems to keep 
the door open for a possible reconciliation between the 
two instincts, it is again his optimistic analysis that 
relies on a predominance of Eros over the destructive 
force of Thanatos (SE XXI, 1986: 119). Then, it becomes 
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rightful to question why the issue of death could be 
avoided so lightly and easily. 
 
     In order to challenge the incompatibility of the 
dualism  that marks the Freudian theory of instincts, 
Brown’s further inquiry regards the instinctual 
operations behind the issues of sublimation and 
repetition- compulsion. Since the theoretical difficulty 
rooted in the question of sublimation is immense enough 
to be treated in some other study,  what could be 
mentioned briefly at this point is Freud’s 
underestimation of the effect of Thanatos in the case of 
sublimation. Accordingly, Brown’s criticism  to the 
Freudian problematization of sublimation targets the 
respective claims on the desexualization of bodily Eros 
and its socialization in return. For Freud, sublimation 
has been a frustration- free way out of repression 
instead of a plain effect of it. Different from a 
sacrifice of pleasure, the energy of sublimation occurs 
to be desexualized Eros as a tamed source of pleasure won 
from the hostile reality of disappointed infantile 
sexuality (Brown, 1985: 139). However, Brown finds this 
ambiguous relation between repression and sublimation 
rather weak. If one of the initial concepts  regarding 
the infantile sexuality is the problematic of repression 
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and if sublimation has got to do with the very same 
infantile sexuality, then how could sublimation guarantee 
the avoidance of repression in full terms? Brown argues 
that it is instead the ambivalent nature of negation that 
shapes the operation of sublimation. With the ambivalence 
due to both the denial and some distorted affirmation of 
object- loss, the negation at stake programs sublimation 
as a continuance of infantile dreaming, as a reenactment 
of primal fantasies (Brown, 1985: 160- 163). Beyond 
Brown’s preference to mention infantile dreaming rather 
than infantile sexuality, there lies his suggestion to 
consider the work of Thanatos in the problematic of 
sublimation: 
 
    If the mechanism of sublimation is the dream, 
the instinctual economy which sustains it is a 
primacy of death over life in the ego. The path 
which leads from infantile dreaming to 
sublimation originates in the ego’s incapacity 
to accept the death of separation, and its 
inauguration of those morbid forms of dying- 
negation, repression, and narcissistic 
involution (Brown, 1985: 173).   
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In other words, the entropy of sexuality that direct the 
course of sublimation is plausible for Brown while its  
       formulation with prior reference to Eros would  miss the 
ambivalent relation between the implications of objects- 
loss and negation that occur on the subject’s level. 
Instead of a linear connection between Eros and 
sublimation, Brown offers a possibility in which the 
dialectic relation between the two sets of instincts 
would bring the question of Thanatos a step closer to the 
explanation of psychical phenomena involved in 
sublimation4. Within that frame, further cricitism on the 
optimistic Eros- civilization coupling of Freudian theory 
becomes possible as well. 
 
     Before going any further with Brown’s criticism, it 
should be underlined that when Brown trades a dualism of 
instincts for a dialectic approach, his aim is far away 
from reversing the Freudian theory and announcing 
Thanatos as the instinctual force- for that would be a 
reestablishment of some other dualism back again. On the 
contrary, Brown’s alternative reading of Freudian theory 
could be regarded as an attempt to criticize the ways in  
 
                                                 
4 Additionally,  Laplanche and Pontalis cite E.Jones to note that   
Freudian theory  nevertheless considers a possibility for exploring 
 61 
which the social and cultural achievements are explained 
only with reference to some psychical management of 
sexual energy embedded in Eros. Brown rather suggests to 
bring the problematic of death up to fronts, reconsider 
its implications in psychical agenda of the individual 
subject and trace the respective program of Thanatos in 
the realm of social and historical. As a result, his 
inquiry offers a pluralist reading of instinctual forces, 
their possible interaction -as well as evidential 
conflict which could be grasped only with a dialectical 
understanding of Eros and Thanatos. 
     In addition to the instinctual ambivalence about the 
question of sublimation, Brown takes into hand the issue 
of repetition- compulsion to discuss the ways in which 
the history of civilization and progress is in debt to 
the problematic of Thanatos. Different from the static 
formulation of the relation between Eros and sublimation, 
the theme of instinctual conservatism in Freudian theory 
does allow for such a discussion. Accordingly Freud 
states that, the elementary and primitive nature of 
repetition- compulsion, which is evident in all social 
life, overrides the pleasure principle and remains as a 
basic principle of instinctual conservatism (1961: 24-
25). Yet the dynamics of repetition- compulsion suggest 
                                                                                                                                          
the weight of death instincts in the problematic  of sublimation 
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an interesting point to consider the history of social 
evolution and cultural progress as well. With respect to 
the fixation  to some unpleasurable experience and the 
unconscious quest for the attainment of pleasure in its 
future repetition, could it be argued that the history of 
civilization is about a related compelling of mankind, to 
seek some ultimate experience in the future for the 
recovery of the past? 
 
The study of repetition- compulsion suggests 
that repression generated historical time by 
generating an instinct- determined fixation to 
the repressed past, and thus setting in motion 
a forward- moving dialectic which is at the 
same time an effort to recover that past. (…) 
In our new perspective the crucial 
psychoanalytical concept is the repression of 
death (Brown, 1985: 103).  
Then the history of mankind for Brown is marked by the 
repressed reality of mortality which brings about culture 
and civilization at the price of some neurotic attempt to 
fight against death (Brown, 1985: 92- 94; 101). For what 
is at stake with death instincts is not some wish or 
desire for death, but a denial of mortality that is 
                                                                                                                                          
(Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988: 433- 434). 
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rooted in the dialectics of being, repetition- compulsion 
addresses an attempt towards the future in order to 
paralyze that dialectics- and possibly to return to or 
re-establish what is lost in a manner similar to the 
element of negation in fort- da game. Following Brown, if 
repetition- compulsion could be regarded as the Thanatos 
element that is involved in the course of civilization, 
could mankind’s engagement with material culture and 
technology be issued with a similar problematization? 
Undoubtedly, Brown’s dialectics of instincts opens way to 
explore what the question of Thanatos would offer for 
cultural and social analysis as well as suggesting 
possible relations between different pieces of Freudian 
theory that require an explanation other than the work of 
libido and/or Eros itself only. 
 
 
3.3. Technology as Prosthesis: In Service of Death 
Instincts 
      
     By the end of Chapter 2, a number of questions 
concerning Ihde’s metaphor of Garden of Eden have been 
raised, to suggest a linkage between the prosthetic 
quality of technology: Where would Adam and Eve’s exile 
to Earth- a transfer from a state of omnipotence and 
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immortality to the state of human-ness, coincide with the 
transfer effect that stamps the construction of 
subjecthood? The aim of this question has been to imply 
that technology as prosthesis serves for a return to the 
Garden, a state lost in the past whose recovery is sought 
in the wanders of becoming a prosthetic God. With the 
evaluation of Brown’s dialectics of instincts, it has now 
become possible to trace the retrospective program of 
Thanatos in human- technology interactions and ascribe 
the work of death instincts to the prosthetic quality of 
technology from a psychoanalytical perspective. 
 
     Since Freud announces the use of tools as “the first 
acts of civilization” in his Civilization and Its 
Discontents (SE XXI, 1986: 90), a faithful reading of 
Freudian theory of instincts would simply forbid such an 
association between Thanatos and [the prosthetic quality 
of] technology. For Freud, mankind’s dreams of 
omnipotence and omniscience have been inspired by gods as 
the cultural ideals (91) while the energy that brings 
such a dream closer to reality is the sublimation of 
[repressed] Eros in the case of civilization. Following 
Brown’s criticism however, psychical dynamics behind 
technology as prosthesis has suggested a rather different 
perspective from which such a smooth operation of Eros 
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could well be challenged. With the definition of death 
instincts as a denial of mortality and separation, the 
program of Thanatos has been issued to be a return to a 
state which, metaphorically speaking, promises the 
reinstatement of the lost omnipotence at  the price of 
‘rewinding’ life that dialectically brings about death 
and separation as well. In other words, Thanatos would 
not affirm life as some progression towards death- which 
is the aim of all life according to Freud, but rather 
affirm a retrospective program to reach the immortal and 
unbounded state that obviously has little to do with life 
itself. Because it is the body, the morbid flesh and bone 
of which is the pure manifestation of the wreckage called 
subjecthood, the program of Thanatos reveals itself 
mostly in the implications of technology as prosthesis 
for the human body: 
 
(…) since life is of the body, fantasy as the 
negation of life must negate bodily organs, so 
that there can be no fantasy without negation- 
alteration of the body (Brown, 1985: 164). 
 
In other words, no matter how much the word technology 
recalls in one’s mind ‘progression’ and no matter how  
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much the word ‘prosthesis’ recalls for the issue of 
supplementarity for some actual loss, the program of 
Thanatos necessarily requires an interference with body 
as the castle of morbid death. Hence technology, is 
nothing if not a pool of prostheses that alter and modify 
the body- the surface of subjecthood- to equip it for 
omnipotence. Accordingly, the seemingly progressive steps 
of technology could equally be argued as those in a 
repetitive- compulsive fashion that seek for ways to 
reinstate the omnipotence lost  during the psychical 
changes that mark the construction of subjecthood. Yet, 
with respect to the fixation of some unpleasurable 
experience and the unconscious quest for the attainment 
of pleasure in its future repetition, the element of 
repetition- compulsion in technology addresses to its 
prosthetic character in two ways. While the flesh and 
bone of human body, along with its perception and senses, 
are being altered and modified with constant interference 
of technology, man becoming prosthetic God occurs to be 
going through that ultimately unpleasurable experience of 
fragmentation, separation and alienation. In the mean  
time though, the pleasure sought in this pattern is a 
matter of re-storing and accommodation in the sense of 
Wills’ prosthetic operations: becoming a prosthetic 
assemblage in both psychical and bodily sense for the re-
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establishment of the omnipotence during subject’s 
experience of death, separation, fragmentation. For 
prosthesis is a matter of rapid transfer, what technology 
as prosthesis suggests is no different: a transfer that 
implies re-storing and accommodation yet a retrospective 
transfer in the service of death instincts to reinstate 
what is lost in the past. 
 
     As Wills’ discussion concerning his surprise to 
recognizing that the pediatric, prosthetic and sexual 
health centers of his hometown one next to another, has 
indicated (1998: 16), the weight of the problematic of 
prosthesis is immense for the construction of subjecthood 
and its psychical agenda. Since Brown’s alternative 
reading on the Freudian theory of instincts has enabled 
to consider the hallmarks of this agenda with respect to 
Thanatos as well, what these imply in terms of the 
problems of separation and lost omnipotence shall now be 
explored in order to discuss the psychical moments  that 
ascribe a prosthetic quality to technology.  
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSING PROSTHESIS AS A PSYCHOANALYTIC 
CONCEPT: THE CASE OF SANDMAN AND BEYOND 
 
Primitive narcissism feels itself primarily 
threatened by the ineluctable destruction of 
the self. (…) The idea of death, therefore, is 
denied by a duplication of the self 
incorporated in the shadow or in the reflected 
image (Otto Rank, 1934 cited in Menaker, 1982: 
95). 
 
If the prosthetic quality of technology is shaped by the 
work of Thanatos, which psychical moments could  be 
regarded as those that address to the problems of death 
and separation as some loss of omnipotence on the 
subject’s level? Deriving from E.T.A. Hoffmann’s story 
The Sandman (1817; 1982), this chapter focuses on the 
construction of subjecthood with respect to issues of 
death and separation that mark the infantile sexuality. 
In addition, the concept of doppelgänger is respectively 
explored to question the value of the prosthetic quality 
of technology for subject’s fight against death.  
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4.1. E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Sandman: The Story 
 
     The story Sandman begins with an exchange of three 
letters between the main protagonist Nathanael, his 
friend Lothar and Lothar’s sister Klara. The first of 
these letters comes from Nathanael and is about his 
encounter with a strange barometer dealer named Coppola, 
who has raised an uncanny feeling regarding such 
childhood memories that Nathanael has struggled to come 
over for a long time. Through the letter, Nathanael takes 
a journey back to his childhood and tells the fearsome 
story of Sandman, a figure that tragically changed 
Nathanael’s life once and for all.  
 
     Accordingly, Nathanael’s family used to be a 
peaceful one, enjoying evenings all together in his 
father’s study to listen to the stories he would tell 
every night before the children’s bedtime. However, some 
nights around nine o’clock, Nathanael’s mother anxiously 
sends the children to bed, telling them that the Sandman 
is by the stairs of the house, coming up. And when little 
Nathanael asks “Oh, Mama, who is this nasty Sandman who 
always drives us away from Papa?”, “My dear child, there 
is no Sandman” his mother would answer. “When I tell you 
that the Sandman is coming, it only means that you are 
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sleepy and can’t keep your eyes open any longer, as 
though someone had sprinkled sand into them.”(Hoffmann, 
1982: 278) Yet, the nanny of the children would give a 
rather different account of the Sandman: 
 
He is a wicked man who comes to children when 
they refuse to go to bed and throws handfuls of 
sand in their eyes till they bleed and pop out 
of their heads. Then he throws the eyes into a 
sack and takes them to the half-moon as food 
for his children, who sit in a nest and have 
crooked beaks like owls with which they pick up 
the eyes of human children who have been 
naughty (1982: 279).   
                                      
Although his fear of  Sandman makes Nathanael lose much 
of a sleep, the little boy nevertheless burns with 
curiosity to see what  Sandman really looks like. Putting 
himself together one night, he sneaks into his father’s 
study after nine o’clock and awaits to see the Sandman. 
What Nathanael witnesses however, turns out to be more 
than what he expects. The Sandman who disturbs the peace 
of their casual family evenings is nobody other than his 
father’s friend Coppelius, a German lawyer that the 
children of the house never favored much for his hideous 
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looks and rudeness towards children. Unaware of their 
being watched by the young boy, Nathanael’s father and 
Coppelius carry out some bizarre experiment-like doings, 
smoke and fire fill the room. Hearing Coppelius  bleating 
“Give me eyes! Give me eyes!” as he furiously hammers 
piece of coals that look like children faces with no eyes 
but deep black cavities instead, Nathanael tumbles from 
his hiding place to the floor with horror. His father 
rescues Nathanael’s eyes from Coppelius yet the beast man 
unscrews the boy’s body, putting his arms and feet here 
and there. Horrified with what he has witnessed and 
traumatized with what has happened to his body, Nathanael 
loses his conscious. With his mother’s care, he manages 
to recover the emotional trauma days after and never 
hears a word of the Sandman for a long time. The next and 
last visit of Coppelius to the family would happen a year 
later and result with a mysterious explosion in the study 
room, costing the life of Nathanael’s father.  
 
     While the fearful memories never seem to leave the 
little boy alone, years go by and  young Nathanael 
becomes a university student living in another city. He 
grows a keen interest in literature, gets engaged with 
Lothar’s sister Klara and lives a quiet life until his 
strange encounter with this barometer dealer named 
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Coppola. Disturbed by the uncanny similarity between the 
old Coppelius and the dealer Coppola, Nathanael’s  sleep 
becomes uneasy again. Could Coppola possibly be the 
Sandman? Could he possibly be back after all these years? 
The young man finally decides to write all this to his 
dear friend Lothar.   
    
     As Nathanael accidentally posts this letter to his 
fiancée instead of Lothar, the second letter comes from 
Klara. Being a commonsensical girl, Klara tries her best 
to give reasonable explanations to what Nathanael has 
written and pays no credit for his belief in some 
creature called Sandman. In hope for soothing Nathanael 
with her words, Klara pictures  this Coppola man as 
nothing much than an ordinary pushy dealer. After 
receiving a response from Klara to his surprise, 
Nathanael writes the third and final letter to Lothar 
again. He admits to  his friend that perhaps he has been 
a little too puzzled in the labyrinths of his childhood 
memories. Learning that Coppola the dealer is an Italian 
friend of his teacher from the university, Prof. 
Spalanzini, Nathanael promises Lothar to close this 
subject once and for all. He ends the letter with a 
little mention of Prof. Spalanzani’s daughter, Olympia 
that he has seen in professor’s house lately. Seeing 
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Olympia sitting in silence with fixed eyes, yet not even 
showing a single sign of noticing Nathanael’s presence in 
the room,  he has wondered what might possibly wrong with 
her.  Telling Lothar about the uneasy feeling aroused by 
this weird state of the girl, Nathanael writes “it seemed 
to me as if she were sleeping with her eyes open” (1982: 
288).  
 
     After this exchange of letters, Nathanael visits his 
hometown and meets Lothar and Klara. Yet, his fears about 
the return of the Sandman shadow this visit and cause 
some arguments between the three. Still, Nathanael feels 
contented among people he cares for. Their love and 
support soon convince him that the dealer Coppola’s being 
Coppelius/Sandman could only be his imagination. When 
Nathanael returns to his university town with a relieved 
mind, he finds out that, his house has been burned down 
during his visit and friends have carried his belongings 
to another house opposite to Prof. Spalanzini’s. 
Nathanael from then on, lives in a house that has the 
complete view of the room where Spalanzini’s strange 
daughter Olympia sits silently by herself all day. Deeply 
touched by Klara’s love and support for him, Nathanael 
does not pay much attention to the girl, though he has 
long been surprised by the perfection of her posture.  
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     However, the peaceful days of Nathanael do not last 
for long. One day when writing a letter to his dear 
Klara, he hears a soft tap on the door and calls in. 
There appears Coppola in front him with all the shock and 
horror he gives to Nathanael. Trying to keep himself calm 
and remembering what Spalanzini told about Coppola’s 
Italian roots, Nathanael only tries to avoid the dealer, 
telling him that he needs no barometers. “Oh, no 
barometer? No barometer! I gotta da eyes too. I gotta da 
nice eyes!” replies back Coppola and instantly puts 
handsful of eyeglasses on the table. “So, glasses- put on 
nose, see? These are my eyes, nice-a eyes!” (1982: 296). 
By the time the whole table begins to gleam and sparkle 
with glasses, Nathanael becomes terrified with the scene 
and seizes Coppola from his arm to make him stop putting 
even more glasses. Since the only way to make amends for 
his behavior seems to buy something from the man, 
Nathanael chooses nicely finished pocket spyglasses. As 
he looks through the window to test them, he realizes the 
sharpness of the vision these glasses give. With an 
involuntary look towards Olympia’s room, he now sees the 
exquisite features of her face. Even her fixed eyes 
appear to be inflaming with ever-increasing life. In 
time, gazing into Olympia’s room with these spyglasses 
becomes Nathanael’s new occupation. Lost in the divine 
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beauty of her perfect figure, Nathanael forgets about 
Sandman, just as he forgets his Klara.  
 
     Only later Nathanael finds the perfect opportunity 
to meet Olympia and that occurs to be a great party given 
in Spalanzini’s. Hearing the rumors that this would be 
the first occasion in which Splanazini is to introduce 
Olympia to the society, Nathanael goes to the party  with 
great excitement.  Looking at her through his spyglasses 
and amazed by Olympia’s talents in playing the piano and 
how she throws every note so precisely when she sings, 
Nathanael falls in love with her. Among the laughters of 
people around them, Nathanael even has one little dance 
with his Olympia. By the time the night ends, Nathanael’s 
love for her has grown even stronger. 
     Encouraged by Spalanzini himself during the party, 
Nathanael begins to pay visits to Professor’s house to 
see Olympia as much as possible. During these visits, he 
finds a splendid listener for his poems. Although not 
speaking much other than “ah, ah!”, Olympia’s ceaseless 
look into Nathanael’s eyes makes the young man think that 
he has never been paid this much attention and 
understanding from Klara or Lothar or from any other 
person before. While the whole town rumors about Olympia, 
such as  how she  stood lifelessly in the party and how 
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funnily she danced like some dim-witted puppet, the young 
lover simply ignores them all. Nathanael indifferently 
keeps his visits until that day when he decides to 
propose Olympia his mother’s ring as a symbol of his love 
and devotion. Taking the stairs to Spalanzini’s, the 
unusual sounds coming from the house catch his attention. 
The shouting he hears would belong to nobody but terrible 
Coppelius and Spalanzini.  When Nathanael rushes into the 
room, he is shocked by the vision of his dear Olympia 
being tugged and twisted by the two in every  possible 
direction. As Coppelius grabs her and runs downstairs, 
Nathanael sees Olympia bumping and rattling woodenly on 
every step with no eyes but empty black holes on her 
face. She is a lifeless doll. Devastated and speechless 
with horror, Nathanael hears Spalanzini shouting 
“Coppelius- Coppelius has stolen my best automaton. (…) 
The eyes- the eyes stolen from you! (…) Get me Olympia! 
Bring back Olympia! There are the eyes!” (1982: 304). 
Soon after Nathanael recognizes a pair of eyes staring at 
him from the floor, Spalanzini  throws them to Nathanael. 
“Then madness racked Nathanael with scorching claws, 
ripping to shreds his mind and senses” (1982: 304). 
 
     Opening his eyes in his own bed with the vision of 
Klara, Lothar and his mother by his side, Nathanael once 
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again depends on the support of his beloved ones for 
recovery. With the help of good fortune, he manages to do 
so and gets together with Klara back again. However, when 
Nathanael takes that walk to the tower of the town hall 
with Klara and Lothar, his peaceful days has come to an 
end again and yet for the last time. As Klara points down 
to the city “Just look at that strange little grey bush. 
(…) It really seems to be coming towards us”, Nathanael 
takes out his spyglasses. What he sees in front of him is 
Klara with eyes rolling with streams of fire. When 
Nathanael seizes Klara harshly to throw her off the 
tower, Lothar catches his sister barely on time and saves 
her. Catching the sight of Coppelius down in the middle 
of the curious crowd, Nathanael suddenly jumps to his 
death, screaming “Ah, nice-a eyes, nice-a eyes!” (1982: 
304).   
 
 
4.2. The Psychical Course Behind Prosthesis: The Analysis 
of Selected Themes from The Sandman 
 
     While one of the strengths of Freud’s The Uncanny 
(1919; SE XVII, 1986) is the formulation of super-ego as 
an agent working against the rest of the ego, observing 
and criticizing it like some double (SE XVII, 1986: 235), 
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the main theme of the paper is Freud’s inquiry on the 
concept of uncanny and castration anxiety as its 
universal source. Taking the uncanny as a feeling aroused 
by the return of something familiar which has been 
repressed formerly, Freud turns to E.T.A. Hoffman’s story 
The Sandman (1817; 1982) to explore the effect of the 
repressed infantile complexes in the arousal of the 
uncanny. However, his aim to ascribe a properly universal 
source of effect to the problem of uncanny, leads to a 
rather thematic reading of The Sandman with a deliberate 
disregard paid to the element of intellectual uncertainty 
in the story. Claiming that the realm of repressed is of 
equal and universal significance for the psychical 
development of every human subject, Freud announces the 
element of intellectual uncertainty as rather 
incompatible and therefore negligible in his inquiry for 
the uncanny (SE XVII, 1986: 226; 230; 232-233).  
Especially with the powerful figure of Sandman who tears 
out children’s eyes, the story, according to Freud, 
suggests a much plausible source to assume the 
universality of the uncanny:  that is, the castration 
anxiety (SE XVII, 1986: 231). 
 
     Yet, Kofman (1991) gives a critical account of 
Freud’s exclusive reference to castration anxiety in the 
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analysis of The Sandman for the issue of intellectual 
uncertainty is equally resourceful in terms of 
problematizing the uncanny. Questioning Freud’s 
intentional ignorance on this element embedded in the 
theme of automaton- the doll Olympia, Kofman rather 
suggests a pluralist reading of the story with reference 
to both of the themes at stake. In Kofman’s alternative 
analysis of the story, castration anxiety and 
doppelgänger appear as two problematics interrelated with 
respect to the fall of primary narcissism and subsequent 
operation of death instincts. Respectively, another 
account of the story by Weber (2000) develops a 
discussion on the lack of maternal phallus and its 
relation to the collapse of subject’s self- image as 
whole and intact. With selected themes of perspektiv, 
doppelgänger and castration, Kofman and Weber suggest a 
rather different approach towards the issue of uncanny as 
well as a diverse reading of The Sandman.  
 
     Although Sandman appears as the castrating father 
figure from the very beginning of the story, Nathanael’s 
true recognition of the castration threat comes with his 
witnessing of the Urzene- the diabolic double of the 
maternal birth scene taking place in his father’s study. 
Accordingly, what Nathanael has viewed and expressed as 
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pieces of coals that seem as if “faces (…) but eyeless 
faces, with horrible black cavities instead” (Hoffmann, 
1982: 282) could be regarded as the boy’s original 
encounter with the absence of maternal phallus. For the 
story of castration is a confrontation to the child’s  
confidence in the ubiquity of the male sexual organ, 
recognition of the lack of maternal phallus could equally 
be taken as the moment in which castration anxiety is 
experienced in the image of the mother as ‘mutilated’  
(Weber, 2000: 215-216; Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988: 
285). Additionally, Nathanael’s being unscrewed by 
Coppelius strengthens the element of  castration anxiety 
in the story- all of which in return lead to the collapse 
of Nathanael’s “narcissistic conception of the body as a 
matrix for the ego: self- contained, unified, integrated” 
(Weber, 2000:15). After that decisive moment, the 
operation of death instincts becomes speakable. Since 
“castration is precisely the impossibility of seeing 
directly (…) for it is always off to the side” (224), 
eyes being the ultimate substitute for sexual organs in 
the story, have become the only means for reinstating a 
[secondary] narcissistic self- image  through duplication 
and dead representatives. That is the themes of 
perspektiv and doppelgänger in the story Sandman. 
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     Deriving from the German equivalent of the word 
glass, Weber puts forth that the word ‘perspektiv’ has 
been used in German to refer to many optical devices that 
are used for supplementing the organ of sight, to unite 
and organize the perspective on a clearer basis. Yet  the 
story of castration shares more than a lot with the 
impossible desire behind perspektiv which, according to 
Weber, is the aim of making the invisible visible to 
discover everywhere as the same. In other words, Weber 
relates  castration anxiety with some deeply rooted 
ocular anxiety to discover the ubiquity of the male 
sexual organ (2000: 18). However, what is uncanny with 
perspektiv is that the inevitability of any prosthetic 
supplement including optical devices, brings about the 
very counter facet of such an aim as well. “What 
prosthesis brings closer is the inescapability of 
separation”, the impossibility of a properly ordered, 
self- contained perspective [point of view] as well as 
the impossibility of an undisturbed and defragmented 
bodily reality (18-19). While Nathanael’s use of 
Coppola’s spyglasses has made him think that “never in 
his life had he come across a glass that brought objects 
before his eyes with such clarity and distinctness” 
(Hoffmann, 1882: 297), what the prosthetic supplement 
inescapably has led to, soon becomes a tragedy. As 
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Nathanael grasps his glasses to see properly  “that 
strange little grey bush” that Klara has pointed to, what 
he is confronted with is the appearance of Klara’s image 
in front of the glasses, with eyes rolling and streaming 
fire (Hoffmann, 1982: 307). In other words, perspektiv or 
rather, his optical prosthesis might have promised the 
reinstatement of the omnipresence of the male sexual 
organ, but has revealed once again the fall of human body 
as a self- contained entity. To refer to Wills here, 
every prosthesis either as an auxiliary organ or as a 
psychical supplement ‘complementary’ to the unitary self- 
image of the subject, inexorably discloses that the whole 
was never anywhere for every entity is constructed within 
the nonintegrality of prosthetic contrivances (Wills, 
1995: 15). 
 
     Weber’s account on the theme of perspektiv makes it 
possible to consider the implications of  such an ocular 
anxiety for the subject’s prosthetic  engagement with  
objects of technology. Yet, the theme of doppelgänger  in 
the story Sandman provides other means to contemplate 
further on the psychical dynamics behind the prosthetic 
quality of technology. In a similar fashion with Weber, 
Kofman too argues that Nathanael’s traumatic encounter 
with the absence of maternal phallus have defeated the 
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narcissistic self- conception concerning the unity and 
entirety of the body. From another perspective though, 
Kofman points to Nathanael’s afterward involvement with 
doubles that serve for his quest to recover his wounded 
self- perception. For Kofman, the lifeless automaton 
Olympia appears to be Nathanael’s narcissistic double, a 
frigid, lifeless figure that Nathanael treats as a mirror 
to reflect himself upon (Kofman, 1991: 142-143). True to 
the extent that in The Uncanny, Freud mentions the doll 
Olympia as Nathanael’s double as well as the means that 
provide the establishment of some [secondary] narcissism 
for the poor Nathanael (SE XVII, 1986: 232). However, 
with other instances of doppelgänger in the story- such 
as Nathanael’s keen interest in literature as a 
substitute for life, Kofman underlines the work of death 
instincts in close relation to the problem of double 
(Kofman, 1991: 140-141). Reminding that it is Nathanael 
himself who gives life to his double, believing in 
Olympia’s vividness whenever he starts to read his poems, 
Kofman argues that: 
 
Nathanael can only create by artificial means, 
by mimesis, by mimicking or doubling life: a 
power of representation, of vision, of division 
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which belongs to the death instincts, not to 
Eros (143-144 emphasis added). 
 
Another instance Kofman picks to represent the relation 
between the work of Thanatos and the mimicry of life 
through dead representatives is the satanic sorcery that 
Nathanael’s father and Advocate Coppelius have done in 
the beginnings of the story. In this diabolic mimesis in 
which the seeds of artificial life are the eyes and eye 
sockets are the mother’s fertile womb, what is observed 
is the reenactment of the primal scene of the maternal 
birth. However, Kofman states that this is such an 
attempt that is doomed to fail for it is always already a 
work of death (145-148).  Returning to the lifeless 
automaton Olympia, Kofman makes a neat comment on work of 
death, a comment  more than just generous  to consider 
the problem of technology as prosthesis and to question 
its promises for the mortal and thus, fragmented subject:   
 
The double is neither living nor dead: designed 
to supplement the living, to perfect it, to 
make it immortal like the Creator, it is always 
‘the harbinger of death’. (…) By creating what 
he hopes are immortal doubles, man tries to 
conceal the fact that death is always already 
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present in life. The feeling of uncanny that 
arises from the double stems from the fact that 
it cannot but evoke what man tries in vain to 
forget (148). 
      
With such a brief analysis of the themes selected from 
the story Sandman, the psychical moments in the journey 
of subjecthood have been depicted in a way to provide the 
motivations behind subject’s engagement with prosthetic 
supplements, technology in our case. Deriving from 
Kofman’s passage above, one final account on the problem 
of doppelgänger and its relation to the issue of 
prosthesis awaits in order to question to what extent the 
prosthetic quality of technology could fulfill its 
promises for the human subject. 
      
    
4.3. Affirmative or Uncanny? Technology and The Double 
Character of Prosthesis 
 
    Although the English equivalent for the word 
doppelgänger, double is argued to be a rather weak 
translation, Menaker (1982) notes that Otto Rank’s 
employment of the word brings closer the ambivalence 
embedded in  doppelgänger. Defining the double as “a 
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projection of some part of the self which the individual 
can love or reject or feel comforted by the belief in its 
perpetuity” (Otto Rank 1934 cited in Menaker, 1982: 95), 
Rank refers to a number of possible projections that  
makes doppelgänger speakable. Evident in numerous 
mythological narratives, doppelgänger could operate as a 
projection of some undesired split- off; or in relation 
to aspirations and wishes concerning the self-perception;  
or as a projection with the aim of defense and protection 
of oneself. A shadow in one time, a mirror image in 
other, Rank suggests that doppelgänger acts within a 
narcissistic fashion in relation to the issues concerning 
self integrity (95).  
 
     With Rank’s discussion, the issue of death becomes 
once more the essential problem for understanding these 
and such operations of the double as he notes: “the issue 
of death, is denied by a duplication of the self 
incorporated in the shadow or in the reflected image” 
(95). Focusing  on this aim of maintaining perpetuity of 
the self, Rank suggests that the issue of double is 
embedded in the very creation of culture and 
civilization, as a search for the immortal soul. However, 
regarding the relation of doppelgänger to the problem of 
death, Freud brings forth ambivalent nature of 
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doppelgänger in his The Uncanny (SE XXI, 1986). While 
assigning the idea of the double to the primary 
narcissism, he more or less agrees with Otto Rank that 
doppelgänger might well appear in every possible 
developmental stage and could even receive a fresh 
meaning in later walks of life (SE XXI, 1986: 235). 
Still, doppelgänger as some preservation or an insurance 
against the power of death, takes a different twist with 
the passing of primary narcissism.  According to Freud, 
as much as it is an assurance of immorality during the 
early stages of psychical development, the double would 
soon become “a harbinger of death” with the collapse of 
primary narcissism (235).  
 
     Within that perspective, this ambivalence of 
doppelgänger appears to be displaying a sheer resemblance 
with the problematic of prosthesis as well. As earlier 
discussion on the issue of prosthesis have indicated, 
Wills does not take prosthesis as some mere supplement to 
the human body, but as a rapid transfer that reveals what 
has always already been there for every entity based on 
the assumptions of self-acclaimed unity and integrity. 
That is the problem of non- integrality for every 
possible entity: the crisis of order, unity  and 
accommodation that is tried to be soothed with many 
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operations which are prosthetic by definition. In that 
case, prosthesis by and large does not operate much 
different than doppelgänger and the promises of 
omnipotence and omniscience behind the prosthetic quality 
of technology is equally questionable. Since Weber and 
Kofman have indicated, the dilemma of fragmentation, 
collapse and death is always there even when some 
prosthetic devices or doubles are concerned. As Freud 
states, doppelgänger is always already the  harbinger of 
death. And so is the prosthetic quality of technology. 
 
     Although the story Sandman has shown  both ends of 
the problem of doppelgänger, i.e. Olympia as a 
narcissistic double for Nathanael and perspektiv as an 
uncanny indicator of fragmentation, much contemporary 
accounts on technology might well represent how this 
double character of prosthesis operates in mankind’s 
involvement with technology as prosthesis.  One of those 
accounts on the affirmative facet of the double in the 
case of technology as prosthesis would come from the 
realm of cyberpunk literature in which, prosthesis is 
more than just a common theme. With a committed focus on 
many cult novels of cyberpunk literature, McCarron (1995) 
notes that the flesh and bone of the ‘natural’ body is no 
more than an accident in such novels, illustrated as 
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always already  exposed to the risk of crash, collapse, 
ageing and mortality. Cyberpunk literature in other 
words, could well be characterized with an overwhelmingly 
negative approach towards the organic body. Whereas with 
artificial organ transplants and the fusion of flesh and 
steel, prosthetic invasion of the human body happens to 
be the ultimate promise of cyberpunk technology in which 
the perfection of cyborg equals to more than just an 
abolishment of the organics. Healthy and robust bodies 
supplemented, occur to be the doubles that promise 
mankind the road to immortality (McCarron, 1995: 262- 
269).  
 
     On the other hand, such an utopian depiction of 
prosthetized technology as an affirming double, is not 
totally shared by every example of cyberpunk culture. 
Picking examples from popular science fiction movies and 
television programs, Wilson (1995) demonstrates the other 
side of the story:  the uncanniness of the double in the 
case of high- tech machines and  body prostheses. Since 
such machines as well as prostheses constantly imply the 
possibility of accident, corruption and dismemberment 
that our mortal presence embeds, these may well and does 
lead to a feeling of abject, an arousal of  fears and 
anxieties that go back as early as the encounter with the 
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castration threat. As machines and especially medical 
prostheses can be assembled and disassembled, put on and 
off, attached and detached, they signify not only the 
delicacy of the organic body but also that of the 
subject’s illusion concerning  self- integrity of the 
body. (Wilson, 1995: 242- 250). 
 
     Consequently, although the prosthetic quality of 
technology builds up and multiplies bodily and perceptive 
capacities of mankind, an unconscious pursuit for the 
recovery of lost omnipotence in the promises of 
technology is inescapably arrested in the double 
character of prosthesis- and technology as well. While 
the prosthetic quality of technology serves the death 
instincts for the recovery of the omnipotence lost during 
the early course of infantile development, it equally 
brings the related anxieties back to the surface of human 
body. In that respect, even if the prosthetic value of 
technology for the human subject could still be plausible 
within the theoretical framework of our discussion, its 
double character makes it rather questionable to what 
extent mankind’s prosthetic involvement with technology 
would exalt him to the stars.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
5.1. Conclusive Remarks on the Impossible Program of 
Technology as Prosthesis 
 
   The inquest of this thesis has been to problematize 
technology as prosthesis which serves the aim of 
recollecting omnipotence and imaginary unity that the 
psychoanalytical subject has lost in the course of his 
psychical development. Deriving from a critical 
conceptualization of prosthesis, selected series of 
psychoanalytical concepts and discussions  [of and about 
castration anxiety, double/doppelgänger and death 
instincts] have been scrutinized in order to discuss the 
offerings of the prosthetic quality of technology for 
subject’s self- image as whole and intact. 
 
     True that the psychical structure of loss upon which 
the contrivance of subjecthood is constructed, inexorably 
feeds itself with the fantasy of self- acclaimed unity 
and entirety of human body. With the ideological 
operations behind well- established dualisms, the proper 
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order of discursive categories and boundaries are kept 
alive, constantly produced and distributed for the 
maintenance of this fantasy. Yet as our discussion on the 
concept of prosthesis has suggested, the appeasement of 
respective anxieties equally demand prosthetic operations 
and relations which however, strangely confirm the solid 
presence of the very same anxieties as well as pointing 
to the impossibility of integrity and unity for any 
entity at stake. In the case of bodily and psychical 
relations of the human subject, one of these realms to 
seek for this two-folded operation of prosthesis has been 
put forth as technology. Yet, no matter how far 
technology could promise to take the subject in his 
retrospective journey for the reinstatement of the lost 
omnipotence, our inquiry so far has shown that the 
structure of loss remains invincible. For prosthesis 
explicitly carries its double character, man’s becoming 
Prosthetic God is a project that is doomed to fail. 
Instead of an escape from the reality of death and 
separation, what lurks behind in this mirror image of 
Prosthetic God rather lingers to be the tragedy of 
Narcissus. 
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